

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2627

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 0222

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JULY 9, 1975

(SALT TWO-666)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER  
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JULY 9, 1975.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JULY 9, 1975

IN THE COURSE OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING IN  
VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON A MOL IMPORTANT PROVISION  
TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WILL BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF  
EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.

THE DELEGATIONS FACE THE TASK OF EMBODYING THIS  
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IN THE FORMULATIONS OF THE DRAFT BEING  
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WORKED OUT, NOT IN WORDS, BUT IN DEED. THIS TASK CAN BE

ACCOMPLISHED ONLY BY STRICTLY ADHERING TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 IN THEIR ENTIRETY. A DIFFERENT APPROACH WOULD NOT BE IN ACCORD WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

I

AT THE LAST MEETING YOU, MR. AMBASSADOR, TOUCHED ON THE QUESTION OF HEAVY BOMBERS. ACCORDING TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF BOTH SIDES, STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES TO BE LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MAXIMUM AGGREGATE NUMBER OF 2,400 INCLUDE HEAVY BOMBERS: FOR THE U.S., B-52 AND B-1; FOR THE USSR, TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV.

TO INCLUDE THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT CALLED BACKFIRE BY THE U.S. SIDE AMONG THESE SYSTEMS IS EMPHATICALLY UNACCEPTABLE. THESE AIRCRAFT ARE MEDIUM BOMBERS AND CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS. THE SUGGESTION TO COUNT THEM AS HEAVY BOMBERS IS CONTRIVED AND CAN ONLY COMPLICATE THE NEGOTIATIONS. REFERENCE WAS MADE HERE TO THEIR CAPABILITY OF REACHING U.S. TERRITORY WITH IN-FLIGHT REFUELING. SUCH ARGUMENTS, HOWEVER, CANNOT SERVE AS A BASIS FOR INCLUDING THIS BOMBER AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS. AFTER ALL, WITH IN-FLIGHT REFUELING EVEN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT CAN MAKE INTERCONTINENTAL FLIGHTS. YET, NO ONE PROPOSES TO INCLUDE TACTICAL AIRCRAFT AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS, SINCE THIS WOULD LEAD TO ERODING THE BOUNDS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN VLADIVOSTOK IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE 2,400 AGGREGATE INCLUDES CLEARLY SPECIFIED TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, IN PARTICULAR, HEAVY BOMBERS. THE LATTER, HOWEVER, DO NOT INCLUDE MEDIUM BOMBERS OR OTHER TYPES OF AIRCRAFT. IT IS THIS CONTEXT THE DELEGATIONS MUST ADHERE TO.

THUS, THE SOVIET SIDE ONCE AGAIN FIRMLY STATES THAT THE AIRCRAFT CALLED BACKFIRE BY THE U.S. SIDE, NOT BEING A HEAVY BOMBER, CANNOT BE INCLUDED IN THE MAXIMUM LEVEL OF 2,400 UNITS, ESTABLISHED BY THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING.

II

FROM PAR. 2(A) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, WHICH STATES THAT  
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"WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT WITHIN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES (2,400)," IT FOLLOWS UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS TO BE LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, INCLUDE ALL SUCH MISSILES, BOTH BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES. THIS PROVISION OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE DOES NOT ALLOW

ANY OTHER INTERPRETATION. THIS MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE ASSUMPTION THAT CRUISE MISSILES ALLEGEDLY ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE 2,400 AGGREGATE UNDER THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING IS GROUNDLESS.

THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 REFERS TO LIMITING AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, PRECISELY ALL SUCH MISSILES, BOTH BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES. INDEED, BOTH BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES ARE NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. COULD A PROPOSAL BE CONSIDERED JUSTIFIED, UNDER WHICH IT IS PROPOSED TO LIMIT ONE SUCH TYPE OF MISSILE ON BOMBERS (BALLISTIC MISSILES), WHILE LEAVING ANOTHER TYPE (CRUISE MISSILES) OUTSIDE THE AGGREGATE LIMITS BEING ESTABLISHED? IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT IT WOULD BE UNFOUNDED TO ADOPT SUCH AN APPROACH.

AS FOR EFFORTS TO LINK THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING AIR-TO-SURFACE CRUISE MISSILES HAVING A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS WITH THE CAPABILITY OF BOMBERS TO PENETRATE AIR DEFENSES, THEY ARE DEVOID OF ANY FOUNDATION. THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS TO WORK OUT QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON THE BASIS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING. IT IS BY NO MEANS ACCIDENTAL THAT IN ESTABLISHING LIMITS ON HEAVY BOMBERS, THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING DOES NOT TOUCH ON THE QUESTION OF AIR DEFENSES. IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED LONG AGO THAT THIS ISSUE IS NOT A SUBJECT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SIDES ARE AWARE OF THE ARGUMENTS ON THIS SCORE. IN THIS CONNECTION, TO RAISE QUESTIONS RELATED, FOR EXAMPLE, TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SYSTEMS BEING LIMITED, IN TERMS OF THEIR CAPABILITIES TO PENETRATE AIR DEFENSES WHICH ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, ALSO CANNOT BUT BE CONSIDERED COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED. TO RAISE SUCH ISSUES WOULD MEAN TO GO COUNTER TO THE PROVISIONS

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AGREED UPON BY BOTH OUR STATES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

THUS, THE QUESTION OF LIMITING CRUISE MISSILES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT IS SUCH THAT IT MUST BE CONSTRUCTIVELY RESOLVED. THE AIDE-MEMOIRE CLEARLY POINTS THE WAY TO SUCH RESOLUTION.

SINCE THE SIDES HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING IN PRINCIPLE ON LIMITING AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS ON BOMBERS, IT IS ALSO NATURAL TO BAN THEIR

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EXDIS/SALT

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DEPLOYMENT OF ANY AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS. AFTER ALL, IF ONE WERE TO LIMIT THE AFOREMENTIONED KIND OF MISSILES ON BOMBERS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME LEAVING THE FREEDOM TO DEPLOY SUCH MISSILES ON OTHER AIRCRAFT, A SITUATION WOULD ARISE IN WHICH, ALONG WITH CERTAIN LIMITATIONS, A CHANNEL WOULD REMAIN UNBLOCKED FOR A POSSIBLE BUILDUP AND RACE IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BEING LIMITED UNDER THE AGREEMENT.

A SIMILAR SITUATION ALSO HOLDS TRUE FOR SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS. THE ABSENCE OF A BAN ON SUCH MISSILES WOULD ALSO LEAVE UNBLOCKED A CHANNEL FOR A POSSIBLE BUILDUP IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FROM ANOTHER DIRECTION WITH ALL THE CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM.

THERE IS A GENUINE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF PROCESSES HERE. IT IS CLEAR THAT IN LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS ON BOMBERS, IT IS NECESSARY TO LIMIT THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT IN OTHER RESPECTS AND OTHER DIRECTIONS. OTHERWISE, FIGURATIVELY SPEAKING, THE

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WATERS WE WOULD HAVE BLOCKED BY A DAM WOULD RUSH AROUND THAT DAM. THIS WOULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE SECURITY OF BOTH, I REPEAT, BOTH SIDES.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS CLEAR THAT AN INITIATIVE BY ONE OF THE SIDES IN SUCH A BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS CANNOT FAIL TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE OTHER SIDE. WHAT WOULD BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF THIS? THE EXPERIENCE OF HISTORY PROVIDES AN UNAMBIGUOUS ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION. IT IS IN THE SECURITY INTEREST OF BOTH SIDES THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE UNDERMINED OR CURCUMVENTED.

THE RELEVANT PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE ARE SET FORTH IN ARTICLES III, IX, AND X OF THE TEXT OF THE MAY 7, 1975 DRAFT. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THEIR INCORPORATION IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT WOULD BE AN EFFECTIVE MEASURE OF CURBING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WOULD KEEP IT FROM SPREADING TO NEW AREAS AND WOULD THEREBY SERVE AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED.

THE ASSERTION THAT THE SOVIET POSITION ALLEGEDLY GOES BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF THE VLADISVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, BY CONTAINING A BAN ON AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS ON AIRCRAFT OTHER THAN BOMBERS, IS PUZZLING. HOW CAN ONE, WHILE AGREEING TO LIMIT AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS ON BOMBERS, AT THE SAME TIME OBJECT TO A BAN ON EQUIPPING WITH SUCH MISSILES ANY OTHER AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS FOR EXAMPLE, TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, CIVIL AIRCRAFT AND OTHERS? AFTER ALL, IN THIS CASE WE ARE DEALING WITH A PROPOSAL TO BAN CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, NOT YET DEPLOYED, WHICH, HOWEVER, COULD BE DEVELOPED DURING THE TERM OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. AND IT IS PRECISELY THIS, AS YOU KNOW, WHICH IS ALSO PROVIDED FOR IN PARA. 5 OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, WHICH IS TO GUIDE THE DELEGATIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

### III

THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF JULY 3, 1975 REFERRED TO THE NEED OF HAVING IN THE AGREEMENT  
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DEFINITIONS FOR THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED, WHICH SATISFY BOTH SIDES.

PRIOR TO THE WORKING RECESS THE QUESTION OF DEFINITIONS HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A VERY EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS. UPON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE HEADS

OF DELEGATION THIS MATTER WAS SPECIALLY DISCUSSED AT MEETINGS BETWEEN GENERALS TRUSOV AND ROWNY, WITH APPROPRIATE ADVISERS PARTICIPATING.

AS A RESULT OF THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SIDES AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WAS REACHED CONCERNING THE ADVISABILITY OF WORKING OUT, IN CONNECTION WITH PREPARATION OF THE JOINT TEXT OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, A NUMBER OF DEFINITIONS OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE LIMITED.

IT SEEMS TO US THAT AT THIS STAGE THE DELEGATIONS COULD ALSO REGISTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO CONCENTRATE THE DEFINITIONS OF SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED IN ONE PLACE IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, NAMELY IN A SPECIAL ARTICLE.

AT THE MEETINGS OF APRIL 15 AND 25, 1975 THE USSR DELEGATION SET FORTH ITS POSITION REGARDING DEFINITIONS AND TOOK A CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVE IN THIS REGARD. YOU ARE AWARE OF OUR REASONING.

IN THE COURSE OF THE WORKING RECESS THE SOVIET SIDE, GUIDED BY THE INTERESTS OF SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES, DEVOTED MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION TO THE QUESTION OF DEFINITIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT PROCEEDED FROM THE PREMISE THAT A MOST IMPORTANT REQUIREMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE LANGUAGE USED FOR DEFINING THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED MUST BE THAT IT BE IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT, GIVEN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, OPPORTUNITIES OPEN UP FOR THE SIDES TO ENGAGE IN A FURTHER COMMON SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE FOR THE DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED.

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 SALT TWO GENEVA 0222

EXDIS/SALT

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AS YOU KNOW, THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1975  
INCLUDES AMONG THE SYSTEMS WHICH WILL BE LIMITED UNDER THE  
NEW AGREEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MAXIMUM AGGREGATE  
NUMBER OF 2,400, LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS,  
HEAVY BOMBERS, AS WELL AS AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A  
RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED  
WITH THEM. IT HAS ALSO BEEN AGREED THAT WITHIN THE LIMITS  
OF THIS AGGREGATE NUMBER, ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MIS-  
SILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS WILL BE LIMITED TO A NUMBER NOT  
EXCEEDING 1,320.

APPROPRIATE DEFINITIONS OF THE SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED  
MUST BE WORKED OUT ON PRECISELY THIS BASIS.

IN THE INTERESTS OF MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS AHEAD, AND  
GUIDED BY THE UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN THE AIDE-MEMOIRE, THE  
USSR DELEGATION IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING  
DEFINITIONS:

LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS  
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"LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE (ICBM)  
LAUNCHERS ARE LAUNCHERS OF STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH  
A RANGE IN EXCESS OF THE SHORTEST DISTANCE BETWEEN THE NORTH-  
WESTERN BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL USSR AND THE NORTHEASTERN  
BORDER OF THE CONTINENTAL U.S., I. E., WITH A RANGE IN EXCESS  
OF 5,500 KM."

SLBM LAUNCHERS  
"SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBM) LAUNCHERS  
ARE LAUNCHERS OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, INSTALLED ON NUCLEAR-  
POWERED SUBMARINES, AS WELL AS LAUNCHERS OF BALLISTIC MISSILES  
FIRST FLIGHT-TESTED SINCE 1965, INSTALLED IN ANY SUBMARINE,  
REGARDLESS OF TYPE."

HEAVY BOMBERS  
"HEAVY BOMBERS ARE NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT: FOR THE U.S.,

B-52 AND B-1; FOR THE USSR, TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV; AND FOR BOTH SIDES, NEW AIRCRAFT BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED, HAVING CHARACTERISTICS COMPARABLE OR SUPERIOR TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED NUCLEAR DELIVERY HEAVY BOMBERS. INCLUSION OF SUCH AIRCRAFT AMONG THE SYSTEMS BEING LIMITED SHALL BE DECIDED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS BY CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, INCLUDING CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SCC."

AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES

"AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OVER 600 KILOMETERS ARE ANY MISSILES OF THIS TYPE, INSTALLED IN A BOMBER OR ON ITS EXTERNAL MOUNTINGS."

LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS

"LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS ARE SUCH LAUNCHERS CONTAINING MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH FRONT ENDS CONSISTING OF TWO OR MORE REENTRY VEHICLES THAT ARE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE TO SEPARATE TARGETS BY MEANS OF DEVICES INSTALLED IN THE FRONT END (IN A SELF-CONTAINED DISPENSING MECHANISM) OR ON REENTRY VEHICLES, WHICH ARE BASED ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC OR OTHER COMPUTERS IN COMBINATION WITH DEVICES WHICH AFTER SEPARATION FROM THE BOOSTER ROCKET PROVIDE THE FRONT END OR REENTRY VEHICLES WITH MANEUVERING AND AIMING CAPABILITIES BY MEANS OF SECRET

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JET (ROCKET) ENGINES OR AERODYNAMIC SYSTEMS, OR BY MEANS OF OTHER DEVICES FOR AIMING THE REENTRY VEHICLES."

NOW FOR SOME CLARIFICATIONS.

AS FOR THE DEFINITION OF A LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHER, A SOLUTION IS PROPOSED WHICH IS BASED ON USING THE CORRESPONDING FORMULATION WHICH WAS WORKED OUT IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND HAS PROVED ITS VIABILITY. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD, THE SOVIET SIDE DEEMED IT ADVISABLE TO SUPPLEMENT THAT WORDING BY A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE DISTANCE BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE BORDERS OF THE CONTINENTAL USSR AND THE CONTINENTAL U.S. SUCH AN APPROACH, BEING IN ACCORD WITH THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, TAKES CARE OF THE MATTER OF DEFINING LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

AS FOR THE DEFINITION OF SLBM LAUNCHER PROPOSED BY THE SOVIET SIDE, WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DEFINITION CURRENTLY IN FORCE IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, IT ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS THE U.S. SIDE EXPRESSED ON THIS SCORE.



THE DEFINITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS ALSO TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATION ADVANCED EARLIER. THIS APPLIES TO EXISTING HEAVY BOMBERS, AS WELL AS THE AIRCRAFT THE SIDES DO NOT YET HAVE, BUT WHICH COULD APPEAR IN THE FUTURE, AND TO THE QUESTION OF THEIR INCLUSION AMONG SYSTEMS TO BE LIMITED.

THE WORDING WE PROPOSE WITH RESPECT TO AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH THEM IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH PAR.2(A) OF THE AIDE-MEMOIRE.

THE DEFINITION, CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSAL BEING TABLED, FOR ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS IS BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING ENSUING FROM THE AIDE-MEMOIRE TO THE EFFECT THAT UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, ONLY THE CITED TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES CAN BE EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. THE PROPOSED FORMULATION IS TECHNICALLY WELL-FOUNDED AND TAKES INTO ACCOUNT  
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THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED CONCERNING THE ADVISABILITY OF DEFINING ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS WITH MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FUTURE AGREEMENT.

IV

MR.AMBASSADOR,

HAVING TABLED A CONSTRUCTIVE CONCRETE PROPOSAL ON DEFINITIONS, WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THIS PROVIDES A GOOD BASIS FOR WORKING OUT APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE ON THIS MATTER FOR INCORPORATION IN THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

WE PROCEED FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE U.S. SIDE, TOO, WILL SHOW INITIATIVE IN SEARCHING FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF THE JOINT DRAFT OF THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT. AND THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE, FOR ONLY BY COMMON EFFORTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE WORK TOGETHER WILL THE DELEGATIONS BE ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH THE RESPONSIBLE TASK BEFORE THEM SUCESSFULLY AND ON TIME.

UNQUOTE

JOHNSON

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